The Iran war has set a precedent for the forcible dismantlement of a sovereign nation’s active nuclear program. Military strikes on nuclear infrastructure are unusual in the history of containing nuclear proliferation and the United States and Israel launched air strikes that incapacitated much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
This has led to the loss of control of Iran’s fissile material. Iran has produced 400 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium that likely is buried under tons of rubble at the Isfahan nuclear complex. There is a historical precedent for uncertain control of weapons-grade material in the wake of the collapse of the USSR. But that original “loose nukes” problem was remedied through cooperation among the United States, Russia, and the former Soviet states.
Such cooperation seems unlikely in Iran, although an acceptable solution could be for a third party to hold the uranium after removal. But, for the foreseeable future, the United States and Israel may be satisfied to allow the uranium to remain buried under the rubble.
Iran’s nuclear behavior has raised questions about how the international system of the future will respond to nations that skirt the fringes of their peaceful nuclear commitments as members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
There is already significant pressure on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard existing nuclear facilities, but as nuclear power expands, the number of new nuclear sites requiring oversight will grow. The agency’s mandate, structure, and budget may not be adequate for this task.
If it cannot offer the necessary control and confidence that nuclear programs won’t morph into threats, coalitions of willing and powerful nations may act in concert to limit atomic transgressions and prevent new nuclear states outside of the traditional international diplomatic framework.
The Middle East’s Nuclear Energy Expansion
The Iran war’s impacts are also rippling through the Middle East with the United States and Saudi Arabia on the path to nuclear energy cooperation that would result in the construction of one or more reactors.
The U.S.-Saudi agreement is an important bellwether for how civil nuclear energy cooperation and future nonproliferation conditions will evolve. Saudi Arabia has two red lines—preserving its right to enrich uranium and its unwillingness to accept the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement.
A Trump administration nonproliferation report stated that the United States would address the Additional Protocol by creating a “Bilateral Safeguards Agreement” to supplement the IAEA safeguards system, with the arrangement unspecified. The agreement may also allow Saudi Arabia to preserve the right to enrich uranium, although the framework surrounding that activity has not been revealed.
These provisions have triggered a backlash because loosening these constraints would reverse years of policy practice that sought to limit the expansion of sensitive nuclear activities. Some in congress are insisting on a “Gold Standard” for this and future nuclear cooperation agreements. That requires a nation to forego enrichment and reprocessing if it wants US nuclear technology. But it is not a requirement under the US Atomic Energy Act, which governs bilateral US nuclear agreements.
While it is unlikely that the United States will undermine its commitment to preventing nuclear proliferation, new global energy security and geopolitical realities are intruding on the old nuclear frameworks. This may require creative new partnerships, policies, and nonproliferation techniques, including adaptations that account for the unique features of advanced reactors.
These reactors have lower power levels and flexible deployment options that are appealing to developing economies with growing energy needs. But they require higher (non-weapons grade) fuel enrichment levels and some are designed to use plutonium.
Emerging Nuclear Challenges
These adaptations and tradeoffs will attract sharp criticism, but they may be necessary to claw back international nuclear market share and keep authoritarian nuclear export competitors, such as Russia and China, at bay. The United States lost its lead in nuclear export decades ago, and it is unlikely that it can regain that role using its old playbook.
And it matters which nation dominates the export of nuclear technology in this century because it has a direct impact on international nuclear governance and its evolution. Russia is the world’s current leader in nuclear reactor and fuel exports. But it has repeatedly attacked civil nuclear infrastructure in Ukraine despite IAEA guidance prohibiting this action. This disregard of the rules has heightened concerns about the vulnerability of civil and military nuclear reactors in conflict zones.
Small reactors can be transported to military forward deployment zones, disaster relief areas, or used to power a variety of civil and military installations. Many of these reactors can be located in remote areas away from traditional security systems. This creates a new dimension in the nuclear security threat environment for which there is not yet a good policy or technology response.
The Iran war has shaken the traditional nuclear regime. It has underscored the inevitability that evolution will be necessary to navigate new nuclear opportunities and challenges. How this evolving nuclear environment is developed, and by who, will determine the safety and security of the global nuclear energy expansion.
Ken Luongo, President, Partnership for Global Security
