As the Preventing Nuclear Anarchy report featured in our Spotlight makes clear, the unsettled state of global affairs, intensifying geopolitical tensions, technology advancements, and the erosion of the nuclear nonproliferation regime has increased interest in the potential value of possessing nuclear weapons in some countries, including some staunch U.S. allies in Europe, North East Asia, and the Middle East.
Poland: NATO infrastructure should shift east and “I think it’s not only that the time has come, but that it would be safer if [nuclear] weapons were already here.” Former President Andrzej Duda, March 2025
Germany: “That we in Europe …need to become more nuclear-independent is a question that has been discussed…for years.” Chancellor Friedrich Merz, February 2025
Turkey: Countries “have missiles with nuclear warheads…but (they tell us) we can’t have them. This I cannot accept.” President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, September 2019
South Korea: If the problem with North Korea gets worse, “our country will introduce tactical nuclear weapons or build them on our own.” Former President Yoon Suk Yeol, January 2023
Japan: Conservative politicians have raised the issue of possessing nuclear weapons, “I believe we should discuss the issue.” Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, February 2022
Saudi Arabia: If Iran possesses a nuclear weapon “we have to get one, for security reasons and the balance of power in the Middle East. But we don’t want to see that.” Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, September 2023
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons remains a bedrock international security objective but the defense and diplomatic doctrines that govern this area are under significant pressure. Regional tensions are increasingly a major driver of weapons interest. This is clear in the case of South Korea where the North Korean nuclear weapons program continues unabated. And in Eastern Europe where Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, now approaching its fourth year, has demonstrated an undeterred territorial ambition. An eye-opening recent example is the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defense pact under which Pakistani nuclear weapons “will be made available” to Saudi Arabia.
This trend should alarm the governments, suppliers, and financiers that are supporting the global expansion of nuclear power. The core interest in nuclear power growth is its ability to address energy security, escalating energy demand, intensifying geopolitical competition, and clean energy expansion. But an international environment that can’t effectively control weapons proliferation will negatively impact the power sector and impose limits on its development.
The existing nuclear security red lines are clearly inadequate for new realities. What is needed is an evolved regime that can address the wide variety of new nuclear reactor designs, novel fuels, and renewed interest in fuel enrichment and reprocessing in a way that promotes nuclear energy expansion without producing the opportunities or pressures for nuclear weapons proliferation. Designing this new regime is easier said than done, but it should be the goal all parties support and work towards.
Ken Luongo, President, Partnership for Global Security
