South Korea’s descent into yet another political disaster is ill-timed and will reverberate beyond the peninsula, potentially derailing the country’s nuclear energy expansion plans at a time when energy and international security are paramount global concerns.
The impeachment and detention of President Yoon Suk Yeol throws into question the ability of the country to follow through on its aggressive domestic and international nuclear energy commitments.
The Yoon policy was developed to counteract the predecessor administration, led by Moon Jae-in, and its opposition to nuclear power.
The Yoon plan called for an increase in domestic nuclear energy from 30% to 36% by 2038 through existing reactor life extensions, and support for the completion of two reactors under construction plus two more.
Globally, Yoon sought the construction of 10 new Korean reactors by 2030.
If the country’s constitutional court validates Yoon’s impeachment, a new election will be held, which Yoon’s party will have a hard time winning.
One result is the potential that the opposition party, led by Lee Jae-myung, would halt domestic nuclear expansion. That was his campaign position when he narrowly lost the presidential race to Yoon in 2022.
The impact of Lee’s election on nuclear exports is less clear but raises additional questions about Korea’s ability to deliver on its current and future international nuclear power deals.
The export of Korean reactors has been impacted for years by an intellectual property fight between the country’s top nuclear corporations, KHNP and KEPCO, and America’s Westinghouse Electric Corporation.
This has just been resolved but the dispute dates back to the previous Trump administration and was related to components in a Korean reactor that Westinghouse claims it owns and that are export controlled by the U.S.
The resolution of the disagreement clears the way for this Summer’s Czech Republic-South Korea $17 billion deal to build two new reactors.
But Yoon’s political problems may undercut his ability to provide support for that agreement.
Korean international nuclear project funding deeply entwines the corporate and governmental sectors. While not state owned, like nuclear corporations in Russia and China, the Korean government is significantly involved in providing finance for nuclear energy exports.
Yoon’s political opposition has questioned whether the Korean consortium that bid on the Czech reactors offered a too-low bid that could require a taxpayer bailout if construction costs rise.
This has led the Czech government to raise concerns about whether a political reversal in South Korea could undermine the reactor deal.
Beyond Europe, a looming question is what will happen with the civil nuclear ambitions of Saudi Arabia. The first Trump administration negotiated with the kingdom on a nuclear cooperation agreement. That would be necessary for the export of American reactors.
There was little chance that a Democratic Congress would approve this agreement if it were presented, and it wasn’t as there were numerous technical and security issues that remained unresolved.
The Biden administration, however, pursued a trilateral deal that included Saudi Arabia recognizing Israel in return for U.S. military and nuclear energy assistance. The October 7 Hamas attack on Israel tanked that agreement.
But in light of the recent changes in the Middle East, and with a new Hamas-Israel agreement in the offing, the Saudi agreement could be resurrected.
South Korea would be an integral partner with the U.S. on Saudi nuclear energy development. The two nations already rely on one another for components and expertise for their own reactor designs and construction. This was a proven partnership in the UAE reactor construction.
If the U.S. is unable to complete a nuclear cooperation agreement with the kingdom, Korean technology would be the best substitute, particularly compared to Russia or China.
But South Korea has to be a reliable political partner in this process.
Yoon’s impaired authority makes him a weak ally with the new Trump administration if he survives. And if he is replaced there will be political uncertainty regarding the new Korean president.
But there are big differences between the anti-nuclear Moon reign which began in 2017 and today with which a President Lee will have to contend.
One is the commitment of South Korea, along with two dozen other countries, to triple nuclear energy by 2050 as part of achieving global carbon reduction goals.
Also, as AI emerges as the most powerful technology of the immediate future, cutting edge technology companies are demanding guaranteed power. Google, Microsoft, and Amazon have already made deals for various nuclear technologies to cleanly power their AI data centers, including supporting small and advanced fuel cycle reactors. Korean and other tech companies are sure to follow.
U.S.-Korean cooperation on the next-generation of reactors is, therefore, the underpinning of a bilateral nexus of future-shaping issues. This partnership is essential but it can’t be built on political instability or inconsistency from either side.
Ken Luongo, President, Partnership for Global Security
