A longer version of this article was published by the Center for the National Interest and it can be found here.
Donald Trump made his fortune by driving construction pilings in the ground, not pondering the physics of how that happens. This focus on building things needs to be applied to U.S. nuclear energy deployment if the administration’s desire to Unleash Commercial Nuclear Power is going to become a reality at home and abroad.
Any real effort to shake the government’s focus from R&D to deployment will require smashing some crockery in U.S. nuclear energy bureaucracy and, by extension, sending tremors through the American nuclear industry and laboratory ecosystem.
The Silicon Valley technology ethos that seems to be pervading the new Trump administration could be helpful in this process because radically remaking companies and institutions are SV traits. But it needs to be strategic, not the slash and burn tactics that have been used in culling other parts of the government.
Developing a Deployment Strategy
There are a myriad of impediments that could impair America’s nuclear expansion that require creative solutions. A private-public integrated deployment strategy is needed to fit the puzzle pieces together, create a clear picture, and establish metrics and objectives.
A letter to the Energy Secretary, Chris Wright, from the American Nuclear Society, asked, “Will operating prototypes be enough to kickstart a full on commercial build-out? Nobody knows for sure.” But after six years and billions of dollars of American government investment to elevate nuclear energy, the answer to this question should be much more definitive.
There also are global and security stakes. The U.S. must compete much more effectively with Russia and China across multiple reactor platforms and fuel cycles to be relevant to the future global nuclear market and establish secure deployment ground rules. According to ANS, “China is running circles around us in new builds [and] Russia has the best ‘zero money down’ offer on a nuclear reactor in the world.” Both are better positioned in the developing economy world to export their reactors.
Some of the stars have begun to align in America’s quest for this goal. The U.S. has been successful in selling large Westinghouse AP-1000 reactors to Poland and Bulgaria. And the U.S. and its allies have aggressively recommitted to the nuclear fuel supply business. The AI boom is driving technology companies to embrace nuclear energy as a scalable, continuous source of clean energy for their power-hungry data centers.
But deployment uncertainty is going to have to clarify quickly if there is any chance of achieving the American commitment to deploy 200 GW of new nuclear capacity by 2050, with an interim target of 35 GW of new capacity by 2035.
A Temporary Department of Nuclear Deployment
With no new reactors currently under consideration for deployment in the U.S., something needs to jump-start the system.
One approach to overcoming the inertia is to work with Congress to temporarily authorize a “Department of Nuclear Deployment (DND).” This can draw in special governmental employees knowledgeable in finance, technology down-selection, large-scale construction, and other areas where the government is traditionally weak, and they can be teamed with the best from the traditional government agencies and labs.
It can be housed and funded by DoE and directed by dedicated senior officials in the White House. The goal should be to get beyond the nuclear research business and into the deployment business to put new electrons on the grid by 2035.
There are three essential strategic objectives for the DND.
1. Provide Assured Financing. The financial commitment to nuclear power’s expansion is weak because private finance is not going to strongly come on board without support and risk reduction assurances from the U.S. government. Some of what is necessary is already in place and should be preserved. But more government financing is going to be necessary for domestic deployment and exports.
2. Capture New Export Markets. The financing will not work unless there are markets that are identified, cultivated, and synched. The U.S. is doing OK in making reactor deals with EU countries. But the overseas markets for small reactors are mostly outside of the OECD in developing-economy countries with small, disaggregated grids and little in-depth nuclear knowledge. Aside from financing, Russia provides operators for reactors it exports if necessary. China will follow suit. The U.S. and its allies need to respond to this advantage. One approach is a new Build, Operate, Transfer strategy that provides operational support for a specified period then transfers the reactor to the hoist country.
3. Build Supply Chain and Coalition Cooperation. The reality is that the U.S. needs to pursue a two-pronged approach to the nuclear power supply chain. One is to build more capacity at home. That will take time and a reactor order book, which is missing at the moment. The other is to better align with allies. A strong coalition will include the U.S., U.K, Canada, France, Japan and South Korea. Managing cooperation, coordination, and competition to contend with Russia and China should be the subject of a nuclear energy summit of the six nations. This should appeal to the president’s interest in technology advantage over China, economic advancement at home, and energy dominance abroad.
Ken Luongo, President, Partnership for Global Security
