A longer version of this article was published by The Center for the National Interest and it can be found here.
The United States’ approach to nuclear energy in 2025 was characterized by typical Trumpian bravado. It offered expansive executive orders, a dose of new reactor rugged individualism, and a warm embrace of government-financed projects.
But the cold reality is that the American nuclear build-out is not building much so far. In 2026, President Donald Trump needs to demonstrate results that can anchor success for the future.
Lagging Europe and Asia on Large Reactors
The lowest-hanging fruit is the Westinghouse AP-1000 reactor. It is licensed and has been built domestically and abroad. The Trump administration has promised to provide “at least $80 billion” for new Westinghouse reactors to be built at scale.
However, the announcement of the government’s financial commitment was not paired with a plan for actual deployment. It was a commitment to a result without a roadmap for success. There are deployment options in America but the lack of certainty at this point is a liability.
By contrast, nations in Eastern Europe and Asia are moving forward with large new reactors. Poland and Westinghouse continue to make progress on the deployment of three AP-1000s. The Czech Republic is moving forward on a contract for two South Korean APR-1400 reactors. South Korea has three reactors under construction. And Slovakia seems to be on the verge of committing to the AP-1000, along with a new agreement for nuclear cooperation with the U.S.
Even under ideal circumstances, the construction time for a gigawatt-sized reactor is eight years. So, the United States needs a much better large-reactor domestic deployment strategy that can quickly result in an order book.
Playing Catch-Up on SMRs
Small modular reactors (SMRs) and advanced reactors are also lagging the international competition, but substantial federal government financial backing, creativity in the Trump executive orders, and collaboration with Canada could close that gap over this decade.
Despite the desire for a fusillade of fission from the Reactor Pilot Project on the nation’s 250th anniversary, the United States is well behind Russia and China on small modular and advanced reactor development and deployment. Russia has already deployed a floating SMR and is making progress on its first land-based version. China will begin commercial operation of its first SMR in 2026.
There is only one US-licensed SMR: the NuScale 77-megawatt (MW) Power Module. It is expected that there will be 25 new SMR license applications in the next five years, but many of these reactors are pursuing exotic fuel cycles that, while offering important benefits, could create problems in the reactor demonstration and licensing process.
The BWRX-300 reactor, which runs on standard light water reactor fuel, could be a shortcut to success. Canada has issued a license to construct the reactor and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has submitted a U.S. construction application. Because U.S. and Canadian regulators have been working together on eliminating overlap in SMR reviews, Canadian deployment approval could fast-track construction in America by the end of the decade.
Decoding Hyperscaler Hype
The Silicon Valley hyperscalers (Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Meta) are making a commitment to nuclear energy to power their AI data centers. But the nature of the commitment is curious, with a glaring gap between existing and next-generation reactors.
All these companies have signed deals with emerging reactor companies, but these won’t be operational before the mid-2030’s. Most are also committed to purchasing nuclear power from operating or resurrected reactors. These can produce data center power in the near term but also raise energy costs.
None of these companies has committed substantial funds to the AP-1000, despite the U.S. government’s financial incentive. This raises questions about whether risking capital on new construction without a government-guaranteed cost overrun backstop is an impediment to private sector support. That is something the administration needs to tackle.
Overcoming Fuel Concerns and Foreign Competition
There are two persistent headwinds facing the administration— foreign competition and nuclear fuel supply.
The challenges from Russia and China are well known and the Trump executive orders are designed to allow for more effective competition with these countries.
The other U.S. competitor is South Korea. While a strong ally and an essential partner in all AP-1000 reactor projects, the South Korean government and its nuclear industry are determined to carve out an international role for its reactors. This has led to friction between the U.S. and Korean industries and governments.
Now there is an opportunity for the Korean industry to partner on constructing reactors in America. But it is unrealistic for Korean leaders to persist in their belief that these will bear their flag. The administration, therefore must incentivize Korean cooperation in the U.S. which can then lead to other critical collaborations overseas, including potentially in Saudi Arabia.
The task of rebuilding the American nuclear fuel supply chain has been fully embraced by the Trump administration. But the process is slow because the supply chains are degraded and the market signals are muddled for prized High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) fuel.
Many next-generation reactors will run on HALEU. But it is in short supply outside of Russia and China. America has produced almost one metric ton of it, but projections are that 40 tons will be required by the end of the decade, and 3,500-7,200 metric tons (MT) by 2050. So, fuel for advanced reactors is increasingly viewed as a critical bottleneck, and expanding production in 2026 is an important objective. The administration is pumping money into the problem, but the question is whether it can accelerate the results.
Ken Luongo, President, Partnership for Global Security
