Commentary Archives - Partnership for Global Security

One Year After Trump’s Nuclear Energy Mandates

Grecia Cosio — Fri, 05 Jun 2026 23:19:04 +0000

A year has passed since President Trump issued four executive orders to advance and expand American nuclear energy. Together the orders created a mandate for accelerated action to recenter the U.S. on the nuclear power spectrum after decades of decline. The executive orders certainly boosted the level of governmental activity, with the Department of Energy providing a tsunami of press releases on progress toward the president’s goals. But the Trump administration has a penchant for valuing optics and quick victories over strategy for the long term. A review of the progress to date provides examples of some impressive advances and some unfulfilled promises.

Licensing Reform: A core principle for the Trump administration is to reduce regulation. And the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was an early target of the red tape reduction efforts. While there were, and remain, concerns about the how the NRC’s independence would survive this initial onslaught, the fear of a compromised agency has not yet been realized. The agency also has taken significant and useful steps to adapt to the needs of small reactor licensing, adopt risk-informed licensing, and balance safety with efficiency of decision making. The new chair of the agency, Ho Nieh, has asserted that the NRC’s ability to make independent decisions is “non-negotiable”.

Nuclear Fuel: One of the most active areas of Trump’s nuclear policy has been creating the ecosystem for domestic nuclear fuel production. America has been highly dependent on Russian nuclear fuels for decades. But the war in Ukraine has led the U.S., along with many other nations, to seek a more reliable supply of fuel. The U.S. government has poured billions of dollars into the production of low-enriched uranium production and HALEU fuel that is needed by many new, smaller reactors. It also supports the production of TRISO fuels that embed uranium in a ceramic matrix. Further, the administration has resurrected plutonium as a fuel for reactors. Whether any or all of these activities can produce the necessary volume of fuel in the time scale required remains to be seen. The shortage of HALEU in particular is a significant problem for the development and testing of a wide range of small modular reactor designs.

Small Modular Reactors: SMRs have been touted as a path to cheaper and more expansive nuclear energy. These reactors are considerably smaller than traditional light-water reactors (up to 350 megawatts vs 1 gigawatt) and many of the designs use fuels and coolants that are more exotic than the existing fleet of reactors. There are a number of programs the government is supporting to drive small reactors from concept to deployment but there are significant challenges. One of the administration’s gambit’s is to have three SMRs achieve “criticality before America’s 250^th anniversary.” Under the Reactor Pilot Project this race to create fission for July 4^th will undoubtably reach the goal. But to what strategic end? Most will produce cold fission, which is a state that does not reach operating temperature or produce power, and therefore does not test the integrity of the reactor design. These pilot project reactors currently are designed to provide a power output of zero to 10MW, which is a long way from the 1.6 terawatts (TW) of electricity growth projected for the U.S. by 2050. After this anniversary celebration another decade will be required to bring any of these SMRs to the point of commercialization.

New Reactor Construction: Trump’s critical goal of having “10 new large reactors with complete designs under construction by 2030” has not appreciably advanced. Last year, the administration ponied up $800 million for the construction of ten Westinghouse AP-1000s in the U.S. But since then, little progress has been made. There is no site selection, no utility partner, and no construction or plan. The AP-1000 is the only American reactor that is licensed, has been constructed in the U.S. and abroad, and is ready for deployment now. Westinghouse has applied to update and renew its design certification to streamline deployment. It also has produced an analysis that states a 10-unit AP-1000 package can create over $92 billion in new gross domestic product. While no new large reactors are headed to construction, the Department of Energy (DoE) projects that the restart of shuttered reactors and the power uprating of operating units will add additional 5 Gigawatts (GW) of nuclear power by 2029.

Nuclear Exports: In general, the U.S. is playing catch up with its nuclear export rivals after decades of stagnation, but it is making headway. China now has 32 reactors under construction and Russia is building 27, including 20 outside the country. A resurgence of U.S. reactor exports includes the selection of the Westinghouse AP-1000 by Poland, Bulgaria, and Ukraine. Saudi Arabia and the U.S. seem to have an agreement on nuclear cooperation that would include the AP-1000. U.S. advanced reactors, including NuScale’s SMR and the GE Vernona Hitachi BWRX-300 have also been embraced by foreign nations including Romania, Poland, Canada, and Japan. And Holtec’s SMR-300 has cleared a critical regulatory review in the U.K. The Trump EOs also call for 20 new bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements to expand the potential market for American nuclear exports. A few have been inked, but the administration lacks an effective strategy for capturing commitments from developing economy countries that are likely candidates for future small-scale nuclear power plants.

Military Microreactors and National Security: A significant advance of the Trump executive orders was declaring U.S. nuclear energy as a national security issue. This has multiple benefits but one is the embrace of the Pentagon of the value of nuclear energy for its missions beyond naval power. The U.S. Army has the lead responsibility for the development of a new class of terrestrial reactors. There are several different initiatives, including Project Pele and the Janus Program, and the reactors being pursued have different missions. Some are required to be transportable by a C-17 and others focused on providing secure power for military installations. The programs also are designed to provide a commercial benefit, as has been the case with other defense technology developments. The Army’s director of reactor development, Jeff Waksman, stated the “U.S. Army is stepping in to absorb that first-of-a--kind risk, so the commercial market can follow, and the national can benefit from broader adoption.”

Patrick Kendall, Program Director, Partnership for Global Security

Ken Luongo, President, Partnership for Global Security

The post One Year After Trump’s Nuclear Energy Mandates appeared first on Partnership for Global Security.

Reordering the Nuclear Regime in the Wake of the Iran War

Grecia Cosio — Fri, 22 May 2026 15:14:09 +0000

The Iran war has set a precedent for the forcible dismantlement of a sovereign nation’s active nuclear program. Military strikes on nuclear infrastructure are unusual in the history of containing nuclear proliferation and the United States and Israel launched air strikes that incapacitated much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

This has led to the loss of control of Iran’s fissile material. Iran has produced 400 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium that likely is buried under tons of rubble at the Isfahan nuclear complex. There is a historical precedent for uncertain control of weapons-grade material in the wake of the collapse of the USSR. But that original “loose nukes” problem was remedied through cooperation among the United States, Russia, and the former Soviet states.

Such cooperation seems unlikely in Iran, although an acceptable solution could be for a third party to hold the uranium after removal. But, for the foreseeable future, the United States and Israel may be satisfied to allow the uranium to remain buried under the rubble.

Iran’s nuclear behavior has raised questions about how the international system of the future will respond to nations that skirt the fringes of their peaceful nuclear commitments as members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

There is already significant pressure on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard existing nuclear facilities, but as nuclear power expands, the number of new nuclear sites requiring oversight will grow. The agency’s mandate, structure, and budget may not be adequate for this task.

If it cannot offer the necessary control and confidence that nuclear programs won’t morph into threats, coalitions of willing and powerful nations may act in concert to limit atomic transgressions and prevent new nuclear states outside of the traditional international diplomatic framework.

The Middle East’s Nuclear Energy Expansion

The Iran war’s impacts are also rippling through the Middle East with the United States and Saudi Arabia on the path to nuclear energy cooperation that would result in the construction of one or more reactors.

The U.S.-Saudi agreement is an important bellwether for how civil nuclear energy cooperation and future nonproliferation conditions will evolve. Saudi Arabia has two red lines—preserving its right to enrich uranium and its unwillingness to accept the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement.

A Trump administration nonproliferation report stated that the United States would address the Additional Protocol by creating a “Bilateral Safeguards Agreement” to supplement the IAEA safeguards system, with the arrangement unspecified. The agreement may also allow Saudi Arabia to preserve the right to enrich uranium, although the framework surrounding that activity has not been revealed.

These provisions have triggered a backlash because loosening these constraints would reverse years of policy practice that sought to limit the expansion of sensitive nuclear activities. Some in congress are insisting on a “Gold Standard” for this and future nuclear cooperation agreements. That requires a nation to forego enrichment and reprocessing if it wants US nuclear technology. But it is not a requirement under the US Atomic Energy Act, which governs bilateral US nuclear agreements.

While it is unlikely that the United States will undermine its commitment to preventing nuclear proliferation, new global energy security and geopolitical realities are intruding on the old nuclear frameworks. This may require creative new partnerships, policies, and nonproliferation techniques, including adaptations that account for the unique features of advanced reactors.

These reactors have lower power levels and flexible deployment options that are appealing to developing economies with growing energy needs. But they require higher (non-weapons grade) fuel enrichment levels and some are designed to use plutonium.

Emerging Nuclear Challenges

These adaptations and tradeoffs will attract sharp criticism, but they may be necessary to claw back international nuclear market share and keep authoritarian nuclear export competitors, such as Russia and China, at bay. The United States lost its lead in nuclear export decades ago, and it is unlikely that it can regain that role using its old playbook.

And it matters which nation dominates the export of nuclear technology in this century because it has a direct impact on international nuclear governance and its evolution. Russia is the world’s current leader in nuclear reactor and fuel exports. But it has repeatedly attacked civil nuclear infrastructure in Ukraine despite IAEA guidance prohibiting this action. This disregard of the rules has heightened concerns about the vulnerability of civil and military nuclear reactors in conflict zones.

Small reactors can be transported to military forward deployment zones, disaster relief areas, or used to power a variety of civil and military installations. Many of these reactors can be located in remote areas away from traditional security systems. This creates a new dimension in the nuclear security threat environment for which there is not yet a good policy or technology response.

The Iran war has shaken the traditional nuclear regime. It has underscored the inevitability that evolution will be necessary to navigate new nuclear opportunities and challenges. How this evolving nuclear environment is developed, and by who, will determine the safety and security of the global nuclear energy expansion.

Ken Luongo, President, Partnership for Global Security

The post Reordering the Nuclear Regime in the Wake of the Iran War appeared first on Partnership for Global Security.

Military Installations for Department of Defense Advanced Reactor Programs

Grecia Cosio — Fri, 08 May 2026 15:08:32 +0000

The Department of Defense (DoD) has been pursuing advanced terrestrial nuclear power for military installation energy and mobile applications since it was recommended by the Defense Science Board a decade ago. These efforts have accelerated under the Trump Administration's push for American energy dominance and there are now four key DoD programs. The map identifies where demonstrations of these advanced nuclear technologies will occur.

Project Pele: Formally launched in 2020, Project Pele aims to design, build, and demonstrate a prototype for a portable microreactor (1-5 MWe) with long-duration operations without refueling, utilizing TRISO fuel, for deployment at remote military installations. The Pele demonstration will take place at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and is targeted for 2028. In June 2022, Project Pele awarded BWXT a $300 million contract to construct its 1.5 MWe high-temperature gas-cooled reactor prototype. BWXT also received a $37 million contract from INL to fabricate TRISO fuel for Project Pele’s core. In September 2024, DOD and BWXT announced that they had broken ground at INL for the Project Pele microreactor. BWXT has begun construction on the reactor core and has completed fabrication of TRISO fuel using high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) at its fuel fabrication facility in Lynchburg, Virginia. Fuel was successfully delivered to INL in December 2025.

Department of the Air Force Microreactor Pilot Program: In September 2022, the Department of the Air Force (DAF) launched its own microreactor pilot program in response to congressional direction in the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The DAF plans to execute a 30-year power purchase agreement (PPA) with a third-party vendor who will construct, own, operate, maintain, and decommission a commercial microreactor (less than 5 MWe) licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to deliver electricity and thermal energy to an Air Force or Space Force installation. In 2023, DAF issued Oklo a Notice of Intent to award a contract to provide a stationary microreactor for Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska, pending commercial licensing from the NRC.

Advanced Nuclear Power for Installations (ANPI): Launched in June 2024, the Defense Innovation Unit, Army, and Air Force aim through ANPI to field fixed, on-site microreactor systems capable of supplying 100% of critical load requirements (target 3-10 MWe capacity), promote rapid prototyping through flexible, milestone-based Other Transaction Agreements (OTAs). Regulatory approval will proceed via civilian NRC pathways, with support from DoE national labs. ANPI proposes to shift to Power Purchase Agreements upon successful completion of the program, wherein the reactor would be Commercially Owned and Operated (COCO) on land leased from the military.

In April 2025, DoD announced eight companies as eligible to proceed under the ANPI program: Antares Nuclear, BWXT, General Atomics, Kairos, Oklo, Radiant, Westinghouse, and X-energy. On April 22, 2026, the Air Force announced that the following companies will develop and operate their reactor prototype projects, ideally transitioning to providing power to military installations:

Radiant Industries will be paired with Buckley Space Force Base in Colorado to develop its 1 MWe Kaleidos high-temperature gas-cooled (helium-cooled) reactor. As a participant in the DOE's Reactor Pilot Program, Radiant is targeting criticality by July 4th. It is slated to conduct testing at INL's Demonstration of Microreactor Experiments (DOME) facility this year. Standard Nuclear has signed an OTA through the DOE's Fuel Line Pilot Program to supply Radiant with TRISO fuel at INL.

Westinghouse will be paired with Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana to develop its 5 MWe eVinci passive heat pipe, "nuclear battery" style reactor. The eVinci will also utilize TRISO fuel. Westinghouse will have the opportunity to test at DOME after Radiant.

Antares Nuclear will be paired with Joint Base San Antonio in Texas to develop its 0.5 MWe R1 graphite moderated, sodium heat-pipe cooled microreactor utilizing TRISO fuel.

The ANPI initiative seeks to have at least one advanced nuclear reactor operating on at least one DAF installation by 2030 or sooner. Next steps include siting and environmental analyses.

Janus Program: In May 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14299 on Deploying Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies for National Security, which directs DoD, through the Army, to commence operation of an Army-regulated nuclear reactor at a domestic military base or installation no later than September 30, 2028. In response, the Army announced it was launching the Janus Program on October 14, 2025, and in November opened a solicitation for microreactor proposals. Through the Janus Program, the Army seeks to prototype solutions for ‘Microreactor Power Plants (MPPs)’ that can be installed at military sites or deployed flexibly for mobile operations. Selected vendors will build two prototypes: a first-of-a-kind (FOAK) prototype and subsequently (drawing from lessons learned for FOAK efforts) a second-of-a-kind (SOAK) prototype. Upon successful completion of the prototyping activity, the Army plans to enter into follow-on agreements with vendors to purchase power and/or scale MPP production.

Dr. Jeff Waksman, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and Environment, who also led Project Pele, is currently overseeing the Janus program and in a recent interview, mentioned that the military is overwhelmingly pursuing gas-cooled or heat-pipe designs, which are far more conducive to rapid deployment and transportability than light water or molten salt reactors. The key challenge with these microreactors, he described, is wear and tear on the reactor materials. Waksman also discussed the preference for tri-structural isotropic (TRISO) fuel. Because TRISO fuel pellets are coated and resistant to meltdown, acting as a sort of containment, the theory is that a reactor would need less concrete shielding, reducing construction costs and making the reactor more transportable. Additionally, although TRISO is less efficient due to its lower uranium density, it minimizes volatile dispersion in case of a shutdown and is considered “walk away safe,” requiring fewer operators.

Cate Donovan, Della Ratta Fellow, Partnership for Global Security

The post Military Installations for Department of Defense Advanced Reactor Programs appeared first on Partnership for Global Security.

U.S. and China Nuclear Goals and Status

Grecia Cosio — Fri, 24 Apr 2026 15:36:28 +0000

Sources: IAEA Country Profiles (USA and China)

World Nuclear Association Outlook Report (USA and China)

The United States, along with 38 other nations, pledged in November 2024 to triple nuclear energy by 2050. President Trump’s May 2025 Executive Order 14302, “Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base,” expanded that goal to quadrupling American nuclear energy generation to 400GW by 2050. According to Department of Energy estimates, this would require adding 35 GW of new nuclear capacity by 2035 alone. Then the country would need to add almost 25 GW of new nuclear power per year in each of the following fifteen years.

The United States currently has 94 operating reactors with a net capacity of 97 GW, constituting about 18% of total electricity generation. The U.S. also is working to facilitate 5GW of power uprates across the existing nuclear fleet and resurrecting mothballed reactors in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Iowa that would add another 2.25 GW of nuclear energy this decade.

The Executive Order identified a goal of having 10 new large reactors under construction by 2030. At present, no new licensed power reactors are under construction in the U.S. However, construction licenses have been issued for TerraPower’s Natrium reactor in Wyoming and Kairos’ Hermes reactors I and II in Tennessee. Natrium is a 345 MW solium-cooled fast reactor. The Hermes II reactor is a 50 MW fluoride salt-cooled High Temperature Reactor. The Hermes I low-power demonstration reactor will precede it in development.

By contrast, China did not commit to the tripling of nuclear power by 2050 until March 2026. Its goal is to have 335 GW of nuclear power operational by 2050. It currently has 60 operating reactors, with a gross capacity of about 60 GW, constituting about 4% of total electricity generated. An additional 35 licensed reactors are currently under construction and are projected to add an additional 38 GW. China's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), published in March 2026, targets 110 GW of nuclear capacity by 2030. If this target is achieved, China would surpass the U.S., becoming the world’s largest generator of nuclear power.

This month, the Chairman of the China Nuclear Energy Association said that China’s installed nuclear power capacity is expected to reach 200GWe by 2040. Another study by the China Nuclear Power Development Center, a research institute under the National Energy Administration, stated that China’s nuclear capacity could reach 335 GW by 2050.

Cate Donovan, Della Ratta Fellow, Partnership for Global Security

The post U.S. and China Nuclear Goals and Status appeared first on Partnership for Global Security.

Congressional Progress Report on the American Nuclear Renaissance

Grecia Cosio — Fri, 10 Apr 2026 15:16:59 +0000

A longer version of this article was published by The Center for the National Interest and it can be found here.

The U.S. Congress is largely responsible for laying the groundwork for what has now emerged as a potential American nuclear energy renaissance. This is a response to many domestic and geopolitical factors including the need for energy security and the rapidly rising demand for electricity.

So, it was timely that the Senate recently took stock of how far this process has come, with a focus on results from the Trump administration’s cluster bomb of nuclear energy executive orders (EOs) issued last May. What it learned is that there is a lot of activity generated by the EOs but little tangible new commercial result.

No new commercial reactors are under construction or contract in the U.S.
Next-generation small reactors are frantically pushing forward with development but there is a long way to go before any are ready for the market.
Bottlenecks have developed in providing nuclear fuel for large and small reactors.
Ensuring robust supply chains and developing a skilled workforce is a significant challenge.
The inability to tame reactor construction cost overruns remains a major stumbling block to deployment at scale.
While Russia and China race ahead with nuclear exports the U.S. lags but has gained some ground.

Reactor Restarts & Uprates: The most successful element in the rebirth of nuclear power in America is the restart of shuttered reactors and the extended life and additional power output of operating reactors.

The highlights include the Crane Restart project at Three Mile Island, that will add 835 Megawatts (MW) of energy and the restart of the Palisades reactor in Michigan, providing another 800 MW. Both will be ready in the next two years. The Duane Arnold reactor in Iowa may also be restarted which would surge another 615 MW to the grid.

The Department of Energy (DoE) projects that the restart of shuttered reactors and the power uprating of operating units will add additional 5 Gigawatts (GW) by 2029 but there are questions about whether the grid will be ready for these new connections.

New AP-1000 Fleet: The Trump executive orders sought “10 new large reactors with complete designs under construction by 2030.” The administration then ponied up $800 million for the construction of ten Westinghouse AP-1000s. But since then, little progress has been made. There is no site selection, no utility partner, and no construction or plan.

The AP-1000 is the only American reactor that is licensed, has been constructed in the U.S. and abroad, and is ready for deployment now. But the administration has become irritated with the lack of progress, and is looking at alternative technologies including the GE Hitachi ABWR and South Korea’s APR-1400. But the ABWR was built in single digit numbers in Asia and hasn’t been constructed in 20 years. And if the administration selected Korean technology for the U.S. market over Westinghouse, it likely would create a fierce political backlash.

Construction Costs: Taming reactor construction cost overruns is central to the success of the Trump nuclear strategy. Lack of a financial backstop is sidelining investment. But this issue was not addressed in the EOs, and the U.S. government is wary of assuming the primary role. One approach is provided in the Senate’s Accelerating Reliable Capacity (ARC) bill, which offers a limited government cost share, but it’s fate is uncertain.

Advanced Reactors & Fuel: Next-generation small reactors and the higher-enriched (HALEU) fuel they need for testing and ultimate operation is a top priority. The U.S. has been investing in rebuilding domestic uranium enrichment capability to produce both low-enriched fuel for large reactors and HALEU. But achieving industrial scale uranium enrichment is years away despite significant government support.

There is a plethora of small nuclear reactor technologies under development, but the headline is the deadline in the Trump executive orders for three reactors to “hit criticality before America’s 250^th anniversary.” Several companies in this competition will undoubtably reach this goal, but most may only produce cold fission, which does not reach operating temperature or produce power. After the anniversary celebration considerable additional work is required to bring these new reactors to commercialization.

Regulatory Jurisdiction: Under the Trump EOs and existing law, DoE and DoD can provide oversight of reactors under development on federal land. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission approves reactors for commercial use. But the Senate learned that there are “gaps and ambiguities” between the agencies authorities that are creating jurisdictional “friction”. This is particularly a challenge if commercial-scale reactors are built on federal land to support AI data centers and defense applications, something under consideration.

Workforce: There is a pressing need to create a more robust American supply chain of materials and workers. To achieve 400 GW of nuclear energy by mid-century, “tens of thousands” of workers and a rebuilt industrial base are required. The Trump EO created remedial programs and the scaling of U.S. nuclear energy will depend on their success.

Nuclear Exports: In response to the unabated nuclear construction and exports by Russia and China, the Trump EOs call for 20 new bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements to expand the market for American nuclear exports.

In general, while the U.S. is playing catch up on nuclear exports, this is one area of the nuclear revitalization agenda that has real deals and momentum. The AP-1000 has been selected by Poland, Bulgaria, and Ukraine. If Saudi Arabia and the U.S. reach a nuclear cooperation agreement it likely would include the AP-1000. The NuScale SMR and the GE Vernona Hitachi BWRX-300 have been embraced by foreign nations including Romania, Poland, Canada, and Japan. And Holtec’s SMR-300 has cleared a critical regulatory review in the U.K.

Ken Luongo, President, Partnership for Global Security

The post Congressional Progress Report on the American Nuclear Renaissance appeared first on Partnership for Global Security.

Status of the DoE Reactor Pilot Project

Grecia Cosio — Fri, 27 Mar 2026 15:19:06 +0000

The DoE Reactor Pilot Program was established in response to Executive Order 14301, which has as one goal: fast-tracking advanced reactor technologies toward commercial licensing. Announced in June 2025, the program’s objective is to have at least three reactors achieve criticality by July 4, 2026. The program does not specify if this needs to be cold criticality or full power. Radiant Industries has stated that it intends to operate the Kaleidos reactor for 60 effective full power days. Valar Atomics announced that it achieved zero-power criticality in November 2025.

The program requires the participating companies to fund the cost of the testing, but it allows them to bypass the Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval process in the initial testing phase. DoE is the authority responsible for the reactor approval. Of the 11 advanced reactor designs selected for the program in August 2025, four have now received DoE approval for their Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis (PDSA):

- Antares Nuclear received PDSA approval in January 2026 for its Mark-0 reactor, a transportable, sodium heat pipe cooled R1 microreactor using HALEU TRISO fuel, with an output of 100 kWe to 1 MWe.

- Radiant Industries received PDSA approval in February 2026 for Kaleidos, a 1 MW helium gas cooled nuclear microreactor utilizing HALEU TRISO fuel.

- Valar Atomics received PDSA approval in March 2026 for a high-temperature, gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor employing HALEU TRISO fuel.

- Aalo Atomics received PDSA approval in March 2026 for the 10 MW sodium-cooled Aalo-1 reactor using low-enriched uranium dioxide fuel for the Aalo-X experimental power plant.

Receiving PDSA approval allows the reactor companies to move from concept validation to execution including final design work, site preparation, and early construction activities, while advancing toward a Final Documented Safety Analysis (FDSA) required for reactor operation. The Reactor Pilot Program represents a significant effort to revitalize the U.S. nuclear industry and meet growing energy demand. It has drawn both praise and criticism for its aggressive schedule.

Gabriela Zanko, Della Ratta Fellow, Partnership for Global Security

The post Status of the DoE Reactor Pilot Project appeared first on Partnership for Global Security.

A Hollywood Highlight Reel for the Nuclear Renaissance

Grecia Cosio — Fri, 13 Mar 2026 15:21:23 +0000

A longer version of this article can be found here.

The hoped-for American nuclear renaissance now has a spectacular highlight reel. It is a cinematic marriage of national security and nuclear flexing that features three C-17’s airlifting a Valar Atomics’ Ward 250 advanced nuclear reactor from California to Utah.

But despite the undeniably priceless political and public relations value of this imagery, it is debatable how much this event propelled progress toward the Trump administration’s nuclear deployment goals.

Public Relations vs. Reality

The Ward 250 flight occurred because Valar is building a reactor test site at the San Rafael Energy Lab in Orangeville, Utah. The Wall Street Journal reported that Valar paid the cost of the flights, roughly estimated at less than $1 million. But the product will be a test reactor, and no power production will occur at this site.

Valar is a start-up launched in 2023, and its founder wants to make it the fissioning counterpart to Elon Musk’s Space-X. That, among other reasons, has helped make it a darling of the Trump administration. It has attracted significant venture capital investment and that has provided it with a certain tech cache that perhaps other more prosaic reactor vendors don’t possess.

Valar is a participant in the Department of Energy’s (DoE) Reactor Pilot Project and its Advanced Nuclear Fuel Line Pilot Project. But it is not part of any military nuclear power project, which makes it an unusual test case for military microreactor transportation.

The Department of Defense’s Project Pele aims to develop and demonstrate the ability to effectively transport a TRISO-fueled military microreactor inside a standard 20-foot shipping container. But the Pele reactor chosen by the Department of Defense’s Strategic Capabilities Office is being built by BWXT, not Valar.

Questions and Claims

Despite the excitement, the Valar flight does not represent “the dawn of a new era in American nuclear engineering , one defined by speed [and] scale.” What was transported was a single, non-operational, and unfueled unit, delivered in three pieces.

It also was not the first time a small reactor had been transported by the US military. There are several examples from the 1950’s and 1960’s. And in 1992, two Russian TOPAZ-II space nuclear reactors, fueled with 93% enriched uranium, were flown by U.S. C-5’s to New Mexico.

Questions also have been raised about other claims of success. For example, Valar announced that its Project NOVA core achieved zero-power criticality in November 2025 at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Former Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy at DoE, Katy Huff, explained, that the test at LANL “was a cold zero power test that did not take the fuel up to actual power densities…I want to see ‘hot full power’ criticality” which allows an understanding of whether “modelling matches reality”.

The Valar reactor seems to have some advantages as the U.S. government has approved its Preliminary Documented Safety Analyses (PDSA’s). But there are numerous other competitors in the small reactor horserace, and several are outpacing Valar even if their accomplishments are less fizzy.

NuScale’s SMR has received design certification. The TerraPower Natrium reactor has received a construction permit for its Kemmerer, Wyoming location. The BWRX-300 SMR has received a construction license from the Canadian regulatory authority. And Radiant Energy is planning a full power test of its reactor this Summer.

Deficient Delivery

Trump is committed to vaulting America back to the top position in the global nuclear power competition. That is a critical objective for domestic energy production and national security purposes. But the administration does not have a sound strategy for delivering this goal. Its run and gun approach to nuclear development is not typical for building sustained nuclear energy capability.

This act-fast-and-break-things approach certainly creates flash and it may generate opportunities. But it hasn’t yet delivered any new commercial power reactors under contract or construction in the U.S. By contrast, China is building nuclear reactors like Lego’s and Russia has signed agreements for SMR exports.

Valar’s high-flying video delivered on two of the Trump administration’s prized priorities. It created undeniably compelling public relations cinema and it projected American nuclear energy dynamism. What it didn’t do is prove that America can achieve the nuclear energy dominance it so desperately desires and that the country needs. That goal is a decade or more away and it requires devoting much more attention to overcoming technical, financial, and policy hurdles than heralding Hollywood highlight reels.

Ken Luongo, President, Partnership for Global Security

The post A Hollywood Highlight Reel for the Nuclear Renaissance appeared first on Partnership for Global Security.

Department of Defense Advanced Reactor Programs

Grecia Cosio — Fri, 27 Feb 2026 16:10:58 +0000

The February 15, 2026 transport of the Valar Atomics Ward 250 microreactor on three U.S. Air Force C-17s from California to Utah received considerable attention and raised the profile of the nuclear reactor development activities of the Department of Defense. While Valar is not a DoD reactor vendor, its collaboration with the Air Force in this case proved that a modern microreactor can be transported by military aircraft.

Traditionally, the Navy has been the military service most associated with nuclear power, as it is used as propulsion in a variety of naval vessels. But the other services have been engaged in nuclear power activities in the past. In recent years, that activity has significantly expanded and now the Army, Air Force, and Office of the Secretary of Defense are all pursuing the development of small nuclear reactors for both military base power and as a transportable power source to support overseas deployments. Much of this work grew out of direction in the FY19 defense bill to identify potential locations to site, construct, and operate a microreactor by the end of 2027. The infographic offers an overview of the major programs.

Project Pele is administered by the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) in collaboration with the Army and Department of Energy (DOE). The goal of the program is to design, build, and demonstrate a prototype for a portable microreactor of 1.5 Mwe power, utilizing TRISO fuel, for deployment at remote military installations. Initial investigations of the technology included the Westinghouse eVinci, X-energy XENITH, and a BWXT microreactor. Ultimately, BWXT won a contract for the mobile reactor design. It broke ground at Idaho National Lab in September 2024. In December 2025, BWXT-manufactured TRISO fuel was delivered to INL.

The Air Force Microreactor Pilot Program, administered in partnership with the Defense Logistics Agency Office of Energy, is designed to develop a commercial microreactor of up to 5 MWe power that can be licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to deliver electricity and thermal energy to an Air Force or Space Force installation. The goal is to establish a 30-year power purchase agreement (PPA) with a third-party vendor, who will construct, own, operate, maintain, and decommission the reactor. Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska was chosen as the initial location to pilot the microreactor. The tentative choice for the project is Oklo’s Aurora Powerhouse liquid metal-cooled fast reactor. The Air Force issued a Notice of Intent to Award this contract pending NRC licensing of the reactor. Oklo is in preapplication activities with the NRC for its commercial Aurora Powerhouse design.

The Advanced Nuclear Power for Installations (ANPI) program was launched in 2024 as a collaboration between the Defense Innovation Unit and the Army and Air Force. It aims to field commercially available, fixed nuclear microreactor power systems for continuous, reliable power generated on-site at military installations, ideally within a 3-10 MWe capacity range. Participating vendors include Antares Nuclear, BWXT Advanced Technologies, General Atomics Electromagnetic Systems, Kairos Power, Oklo, Radiant Industries, Westinghouse, and X-energy. The project is now in the prototyping phase. The program utilizes Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreements and milestone-based contracting vehicles that bypass traditional procurement timelines. To stimulate the domestic commercial advanced nuclear industry and supply chains, regulatory approval is to proceed via civilian NRC pathways, with support from Department of Energy national labs.

The Janus Program is the most recent military microreactor initiative, having been launched in October 2025. It is administered by the Army and the Defense Innovation Unit. It aims to deploy commercially owned and operated microreactors of 1-20 MWe power for use on domestic military installations no later than Sept. 30, 2028. So far, no reactor vendors have been chosen. In November 2025, the Army identified 9 sites for potential deployment which can be seen on the map.

Cate Donovan, Della Ratta Fellow, Partnership for Global Security

Ken Luongo, President, Partnership for Global Security

The post Department of Defense Advanced Reactor Programs appeared first on Partnership for Global Security.

Public Next-Gen Nuclear Stock Performance Tracker

Grecia Cosio — Fri, 30 Jan 2026 16:25:31 +0000

When the Trump administration arrived in January 2025 it made expanding U.S. nuclear power a major item on its “energy dominance” agenda. It now has identified 8 Big Wins in its first year, including “Unleashing American-Made SMRs” and forging ahead with advanced reactors. There are a significant number of these types of next-generation reactors under development. Many are still in the design phase but a number of them have MOUs with the nation’s major technology companies to power data centers. Some of these new reactors may be tested on federal land and potentially operated on military bases. All require future licensing for commercial operation, and only NuScale’s Power Module has received design approval.

Many of the next-gen reactor companies are privately held, but a few are publicly traded. These graphs provide an overview of how three publicly traded SMR and advanced reactor companies, NANO Nuclear, Oklo, and NuScale, performed in the stock market in 2025. A significant climb in value occurred between the announcement of the Trump nuclear energy Executive Orders in late May 2025 and the announcement of the Department of Defense’s Janus program in mid-October. All three companies hit their lowest stock price for the year in April and their highest price on October 15 or 16. Since then, the values have significantly cooled. But ending this week, all remain above the January 2025 level.

Ken Luongo, President, Partnership for Global Security

Cate Donovan, Della Ratta Fellow, Partnership for Global Security

The post Public Next-Gen Nuclear Stock Performance Tracker appeared first on Partnership for Global Security.

A Nuclear Power Perspective for 2026

Grecia Cosio — Fri, 16 Jan 2026 16:23:20 +0000

A longer version of this article was published by The Center for the National Interest and it can be found here.

The United States’ approach to nuclear energy in 2025 was characterized by typical Trumpian bravado. It offered expansive executive orders, a dose of new reactor rugged individualism, and a warm embrace of government-financed projects.

But the cold reality is that the American nuclear build-out is not building much so far. In 2026, President Donald Trump needs to demonstrate results that can anchor success for the future.

Lagging Europe and Asia on Large Reactors

The lowest-hanging fruit is the Westinghouse AP-1000 reactor. It is licensed and has been built domestically and abroad. The Trump administration has promised to provide “at least $80 billion” for new Westinghouse reactors to be built at scale.

However, the announcement of the government’s financial commitment was not paired with a plan for actual deployment. It was a commitment to a result without a roadmap for success. There are deployment options in America but the lack of certainty at this point is a liability.

By contrast, nations in Eastern Europe and Asia are moving forward with large new reactors. Poland and Westinghouse continue to make progress on the deployment of three AP-1000s. The Czech Republic is moving forward on a contract for two South Korean APR-1400 reactors. South Korea has three reactors under construction. And Slovakia seems to be on the verge of committing to the AP-1000, along with a new agreement for nuclear cooperation with the U.S.

Even under ideal circumstances, the construction time for a gigawatt-sized reactor is eight years. So, the United States needs a much better large-reactor domestic deployment strategy that can quickly result in an order book.

Playing Catch-Up on SMRs

Small modular reactors (SMRs) and advanced reactors are also lagging the international competition, but substantial federal government financial backing, creativity in the Trump executive orders, and collaboration with Canada could close that gap over this decade.

Despite the desire for a fusillade of fission from the Reactor Pilot Project on the nation’s 250^th anniversary, the United States is well behind Russia and China on small modular and advanced reactor development and deployment. Russia has already deployed a floating SMR and is making progress on its first land-based version. China will begin commercial operation of its first SMR in 2026.

There is only one US-licensed SMR: the NuScale 77-megawatt (MW) Power Module. It is expected that there will be 25 new SMR license applications in the next five years, but many of these reactors are pursuing exotic fuel cycles that, while offering important benefits, could create problems in the reactor demonstration and licensing process.

The BWRX-300 reactor, which runs on standard light water reactor fuel, could be a shortcut to success. Canada has issued a license to construct the reactor and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has submitted a U.S. construction application. Because U.S. and Canadian regulators have been working together on eliminating overlap in SMR reviews, Canadian deployment approval could fast-track construction in America by the end of the decade.

Decoding Hyperscaler Hype

The Silicon Valley hyperscalers (Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Meta) are making a commitment to nuclear energy to power their AI data centers. But the nature of the commitment is curious, with a glaring gap between existing and next-generation reactors.

All these companies have signed deals with emerging reactor companies, but these won’t be operational before the mid-2030’s. Most are also committed to purchasing nuclear power from operating or resurrected reactors. These can produce data center power in the near term but also raise energy costs.

None of these companies has committed substantial funds to the AP-1000, despite the U.S. government’s financial incentive. This raises questions about whether risking capital on new construction without a government-guaranteed cost overrun backstop is an impediment to private sector support. That is something the administration needs to tackle.

Overcoming Fuel Concerns and Foreign Competition

There are two persistent headwinds facing the administration— foreign competition and nuclear fuel supply.

The challenges from Russia and China are well known and the Trump executive orders are designed to allow for more effective competition with these countries.

The other U.S. competitor is South Korea. While a strong ally and an essential partner in all AP-1000 reactor projects, the South Korean government and its nuclear industry are determined to carve out an international role for its reactors. This has led to friction between the U.S. and Korean industries and governments.

Now there is an opportunity for the Korean industry to partner on constructing reactors in America. But it is unrealistic for Korean leaders to persist in their belief that these will bear their flag. The administration, therefore must incentivize Korean cooperation in the U.S. which can then lead to other critical collaborations overseas, including potentially in Saudi Arabia.

The task of rebuilding the American nuclear fuel supply chain has been fully embraced by the Trump administration. But the process is slow because the supply chains are degraded and the market signals are muddled for prized High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) fuel.

Many next-generation reactors will run on HALEU. But it is in short supply outside of Russia and China. America has produced almost one metric ton of it, but projections are that 40 tons will be required by the end of the decade, and 3,500-7,200 metric tons (MT) by 2050. So, fuel for advanced reactors is increasingly viewed as a critical bottleneck, and expanding production in 2026 is an important objective. The administration is pumping money into the problem, but the question is whether it can accelerate the results.

Ken Luongo, President, Partnership for Global Security

The post A Nuclear Power Perspective for 2026 appeared first on Partnership for Global Security.

Commentary Archives - Partnership for Global Security

One Year After Trump’s Nuclear Energy Mandates

Reordering the Nuclear Regime in the Wake of the Iran War￼

Military Installations for Department of Defense Advanced Reactor Programs

U.S. and China Nuclear Goals and Status

Congressional Progress Report on the American Nuclear Renaissance

Status of the DoE Reactor Pilot Project

A Hollywood Highlight Reel for the Nuclear Renaissance

Department of Defense Advanced Reactor Programs

Public Next-Gen Nuclear Stock Performance Tracker

A Nuclear Power Perspective for 2026￼

Reordering the Nuclear Regime in the Wake of the Iran War

A Nuclear Power Perspective for 2026